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Editorial 
Welcome to this issue of The Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapist, which includes three 
articles on topics such as Substance abusing adolescents, Depression and cognitive-
vulnerability and a new Training and Education section featuring a contribution from      
Professor Windy Dryden. 
We are currently also working on our next issue, which will be available in early 2011 cover-
ing the application and research of Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT) into ar-
eas such as Anger, Resilience and Dog behavioural problems. 
For future issues case studies, book reviews, research, and papers focusing on REBT and 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy are welcome. 
 
Professor Stephen Palmer PhD & Dr Siobhain O’Riordan PhD 
Centre for Stress Management, London, UK 
Email: palmer@centresofexpertise.com 
Email: siobhain.oriordan@btinternet.com 
 5 
The Rat ional  Emotive Behaviour Therapist  Vo l  13,  Number 1 (2010)  
 
Introduction 
Substance abuse among adolescents is a hot topic. In the UK and Ireland it would appear 
that we have a greater problem with this issue than our continental neighbours. The Euro-
pean School Survey Project on Alcohol and other Drugs (ESPAD) project surveys the pattern 
of use of a variety of substances by 15 and 16 year old children across Europe. Their most re-
cent survey was completed in 2007 and found that 56% of Irish and 70% of British teenagers 
had drank alcohol in the previous thirty days while 26% and 33% of Irish and British teenag-
ers (respectively) had been drunk in the same period. By contrast, the percentage of teenag-
ers reporting being drunk n the last 30 days in Portugal Sweden (11%), Italy (12%) and 
Greece (12%) are considerably lower. A similar picture emerges when cannabis smoking is 
examined – 9% of Irish teenagers and 11% of British teenagers have smoked cannabis in the 
preceding thirty days compared to only 1% of Swedish and 3% of Greek teenagers (Hibell et 
al. 2009). 
As a result a considerable amount of research and discussion has gone into developing CBT 
interventions for this population. In Ireland the latest mental health policy document, “A  
Vision for Change” has called for the development of four specialist teams to deal with ado-
lescents with “dual-diagnosis”, and specifically recommends the employment of counsellors 
with expertise in motivational enhancement therapy and / or CBT (Department of Health & 
Children 2006). In 2005 a Government report was published in Ireland which outlined how 
substance abuse services for adolescents should be developed (Department of Health & Chil-
dren 2005). Many leading REBT theorists have also published books about the use of their 
techniques with those with substance abuse problems (Ellis et al. 1988, Ellis & Velten 1992, 
Dryden & Matweychuk 2000, Bishop 2001) but there has been little attention given to       
applying REBT with adolescents who abuse substances. It is generally accepted that apply-
ing REBT with children and adolescents requires a different approach than when working 
with adults (DiGiuseppe & Bernard 2006). It is hoped that this article will provide some    
information for those who are attempting to use REBT with adolescents who are presenting 
with substance abuse issues. 
Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy 
with Substance Abusing Adolescents 
Philip James 
Substance abuse among adolescents is a growing concern in both the UK and Ireland. Both countries 
consistently report high rates of substance misuse among their teenagers when compared to their 
European neighbours. As a result many adolescents presenting for therapy may have substance 
abuse problems making it vital that REBT therapists working with this age group are able to provide 
appropriate interventions. This article examines adolescent subsrance misuse and covers many areas 
including rates of substance abuse, the REBT perspective and research on substance abuse as well as 
many practical considerations. Finally it makes some suggestions for the development of REBT in 
this area. 
Key words: Adolescents, substance misuse, alcohol, review article, REBT 
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The Evidence for CBT and REBT with Substance Abusing Adolescents 
Since the 1970's many studies have been completed which have demonstrated the effective-
ness of general CBT interventions with adults presenting with substance abuse problems. It 
is important to note that these studies vary greatly in the type of interventions being applied 
and the format. For example, many studies on CBT with substance abuse appear to be 
skewed towards the behavioural end of the spectrum and almost totally ignore the cognitive 
end. Likewise the delivery of the intervention varies considerably such as the use of individ-
ual or group therapy. More recently studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of CBT in-
terventions with adolescents but these studies are plagued by numerous methodological 
flaws including small samples, inadequate control or comparison groups and even no descrip-
tion of the intervention provided (Kaminer & Waldron 2006). 
There has been some research carried out on the effectiveness of REBT with substance 
abuse. For example, Mas-Baga (2000) reported on a programme where REBT was used as 
the treatment of choice in a therapeutic community. While he reports some good results, the 
study again has considerable methodological limitations. In a review of the research into the 
effectiveness of REBT for alcohol problems, Terjesen et al. (2000) concluded that there was 
not strong evidence for REBT’s effectiveness. While REBT frequently results in changes in 
irrational thinking this only resulted in limited behavioural change. It would appear that 
REBT requires more research into its use with substance abusing clients and this should 
also include its use with adolescents. Meanwhile the numerous books have been published 
for professionals and outline the REBT theory of addiction do not contain chapters on apply-
ing REBT with adolescents presenting with substance abuse problems (Ellis et al. 1988, 
Bishop 2001). Likewise, the most recent book on REBT with children does not contain a 
chapter related to substance abuse (Ellis & Bernard 2006). However, Gonzalez et al. (2004) 
completed a meta-analysis of 19 studies on the effectiveness of REBT with children and ado-
lescents. They concluded that REBT had a significant positive effect on a number of out-
comes, in particular disruptive behaviours. This would provide some hope that REBT is 
likely to be effective with children and adolescents who have substance abuse problems. 
 
The REBT theory of addiction 
Ellis and colleagues (1988) have described four patterns of alcohol or substance abuse. They 
are: 
The abstinence and LFT pattern 
The intoxication as coping pattern 
The intoxication equals worthlessness pattern 
The demand for excitement pattern 
In the abstinence and Low Frustration Tolerance (LFT) pattern the client has LFT in rela-
tion to postponing drug use – i.e. “I can’t stand being deprived of drugs / alcohol”. This irra-
tional belief leads the client to experience discomfort anxiety which is alleviated when they 
use the desired substance and thus a vicious circle has begun. The intoxication as coping pat-
tern is similar to the LFT pattern outlined above except here the LFT is a secondary or 
meta-emotional problem related to dealing with a primary problem. For example, a client 
who is depressed about a relationship break-up may then have LFT in relation to dealing 
with the depression and alcohol is used to alleviate the frustration about dealing with the 
depression. In the intoxication equals worthless pattern clients sometimes conclude that 
their drinking or drug use and the effects of it, such as rows, over spending etc, are evidence 
that they are worthless. This irrational belief leads to guilt and depression, the client in turn 
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uses drugs or alcohol to alleviate these feelings, leading to more depression and guilt and 
therefore more drinking. Finally, Ellis et al. (1988) hypothesise that some clients may have a 
strong sensation seeking personality and use substances to create a “party” to rid themselves 
of boredom which they termed the demand for excitement pattern. 
Ellis et al. (1988) point out that one of the difficulties in getting clients to work on their sub-
stance abuse problem is the fact that alcohol and other drugs frequently work as effective 
measures in reducing negative emotions such as anxiety – at least in the short term. Sub-
stances definitely work more quickly than psychotherapy (and with less effort) and so their 
use can be negatively reinforcing resulting in a spiral effect of increasing use. Unfortunately 
they are not long term solutions to the client’s difficulties and usually create more problems 
than they solve but clients acting on irrational beliefs rarely act in their long term interest. 
 
Some important points when working with adolescents 
It is important to adept your REBT techniques to take into account the age of your clients. 
DiGiuseppe and Bernard (2006) suggest that children under the age of 12 years approxi-
mately are not sufficiently cognitively developed so as to enable them to understand the type 
of abstract disputes typically used when working with adults. Therefore, particularly when 
working with younger children concrete examples should be examined and the therapy 
should be active to encourage involvement. Wilde (1992) recommends that therapists bear 
numerous things in mind when working with adolescents – for example they tend to have 
considerable insecurities and often work hard to hide them, they can be very sensitive to per-
ceived criticism and they often define themselves through their group associations as they 
tend to have a poor sense of self. A further and enlightening discussion on the principles of 
working with adolescents can be found in Young (1989). 
Based upon the literature and the 'author's' experiences there are some further points to 
bear in mind when working with adolescents who are abusing substances. One of the most 
important issues is when do you treat a teenager who is using drugs. Adolescence is a time of 
experiment and self discovery. Consequently it is also a time when many teenagers experi-
ment with drugs or alcohol and it is not possible to treat every child who drinks alcohol or 
uses drugs. Many teenagers who present (or are presented) for treatment in relation to drugs 
or alcohol do not meet the usual criteria in relation to substance dependence. The most prag-
matic solution is to focus on the client’s trajectory in the assessment. For example, is the sub-
stance use causing harm in the various aspects of functioning such as relationships, hobbies 
and school work? Where is this young person likely to be in six months time? A 16 year old 
who has admitted to smoking cannabis weekly but who is getting on well in school and main-
tains a strong interest in extra curricular activities may not need intervention. On the other 
hand a 16 year old who drinks alcohol monthly but when drinking usually gets into physical 
fights and trouble with the police may be a good candidate for treatment. In essence the aim 
is to foster a system where those who are presenting are assessed to see how much harm 
they are experiencing – if there appears to be little or no harm a brief educational interven-
tion is often enough to encourage the teenager to examine their drug use. Full therapeutic 
interventions are best reserved for clients who have definite harm as a result of their drug 
use. 
It is important also to think about how treatments will be delivered. Poulin et al. (2001) 
found that teenagers who participated in a CBT group got worse in relation to smoking and 
teacher rated delinquency. Based upon this article many people now believe that group inter-
ventions are contra-indicated with teenagers with substance abuse problems. However, re-
cent reviews of the evidence for CBT with adolescents with substance abuse problems have 
concluded that group CBT is effective, (Waldron and Kaminer 2004, Kaminer and Waldron 
2006). In fact, as most teenagers use substances while in the company with their peers, 
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groups could in fact have an added benefit in preparing teenager for dealing with such situa-
tions, (Waldron & Kaminer 2004). The contradictory findings of Poulin et al. (2001) and 
Kaminer and Waldron (2006) have been explained by the different focuses of the two groups: 
Poulin was providing a preventative intervention while Kaminer and Waldron examined the 
literature on interventions with those with identified substance abuse problems. Therefore 
group REBT interventions for those with substance abuse problems are likely to be effective. 
In addition many young people presenting with addiction problems also have co-morbid men-
tal health problems. Many mental health services take the view that clients need to deal 
with their substance abuse problem prior to obtaining treatment for their mental health 
problem. International research indicates that best outcomes are achieved when both prob-
lem are addressed together (Whitmore & Riggs 2006). Therefore the use of a multi-
disciplinary approach is advisable, including Psychiatrists, Psychologists and Social Workers 
among others. Closely related to this is the issue of parental involvement. The parents of 
substance abusing teenagers may suffer considerable distress and disturbance in relation to 
their child’s substance abuse (Usher et al. 2007) and parents are likely to have considerable 
impact on a client’s progress in treatment. As a result some form of parent or family inter-
vention is warranted and this may be delivered as either traditional family therapy (Schmidt 
et al. 1996, Hogue et al. 2006) or as an REBT style intervention (Ellis 2001, Joyce 2006). 
Closely related to this is the issue of consent. In the UK, children aged 16 and 17 can legally 
consent to treatment and in some cases children younger than this can be deemed competent 
to consent if they are intelligent enough to comprehend their situation and treatments in-
volved. This process is referred to as ‘Gillick Consent’, (Christian & Gilvarry 2002). However, 
this is based in case law and so far has yet to be applied to substance abuse treatment. In 
Ireland, under 18’s are legally regarded as children according to various Acts. However, the 
‘Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act’ (Government of Ireland 1997) reduced the age of 
consent to 16 for surgical, medical and dental treatments but did not address psychological 
treatments directly. Therefore, regardless of the jurisdiction someone is working in, attempts 
should be made to have parental or guardian consent when working with anyone aged below 
18. If for some reason this is not possible the attempts made to do so should be documented 
and treatment be provided so long as the teenager is 16 or over and the clinician is satisfied 
that the individual is competent to provide the consent. I would caution against providing 
treatment to those aged under 16 years without consent from a parent or guardian. Regard-
less of the situation all decisions and the rationale for arriving at that decision should be 
clearly documented and ideally not taken by an individual. The decision can be discussed 
with a supervisor, manager or colleague and this discussion should also be documented. 
One final consideration when working with teenagers is the notion of therapeutic goals. 
Within substance abuse treatment there are two broad goals: abstinence and reduction. Most 
of the REBT books proffer abstinence as the goal of therapy (Ellis et al. 1988, Ellis & Velten 
1992, Tate 1997) and this is also the goal suggested in Cognitive Therapy (Beck et al. 1993). 
However, Bishop (2001) provides an interesting discussion on this topic and concludes that 
while abstinence is usually the ideal result for those with substance abuse problems the real-
ity is that many people are likely to have some relapses in the future. He therefore suggests 
a pragmatic approach where the goal is set as whichever is likely to encourage the client into 
treatment as any reduction is likely to be an improvement. I believe that this is a very useful 
approach with teenagers. Many teenagers find it difficult to contemplate the idea of never 
using again and such a goal may scare them away from therapy. The goal is therefore set in 
line with the client’s goal and can always be revisited later. It is also important to bear in 
mind the fact that many teenagers who present for treatment will be abusing a variety of 
substances with alcohol and cannabis being the most common. Different goals will need to be 
set with each substance the client is using, for example to stop using cannabis and to reduce 
the use of alcohol. 
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Developing the use of REBT with substance abuse 
As mentioned earlier there is little empirical evidence at present to support the use of REBT 
with addictions. The author, like many other REBT therapists believe that REBT is likely to 
prove effective with substance abusing clients regardless of age. In this final section two sug-
gestions are made regarding possible ways for developing REBT by incorporating ideas 
which have been developed within other therapies. Dryden (1991) has argued for some time 
that REBT can be improved by using ideas and techniques from other forms of therapy in a 
theoretically consistent manner. 
The first issue I would like to discuss is the difficulty in trying to get clients to commit to 
therapy. Many clients with substance abuse problems do not see themselves as having a 
problem and are “sent” to therapy by a third party such as police, courts or parents. Bishop 
(2001) provides a useful framework for considering clients with substance abuse problems. 
He postulates that clients tend to fall into three categories. Type 1 clients do not believe or 
recognise they have a problem and are often in therapy because they were sent. Type 2 cli-
ents can recognise that they have a problem but are not sure if they want to do anything 
about it or if anything can be done. Finally, Type 3 clients are not ambivalent and know ex-
actly what they want to change. Bishop also points out that clients are unlikely to be at the 
same point with each problem or substance. They may be a Type 3 client in relation to their 
cocaine use and a Type 1 client in relation to their alcohol use. The purpose of conceptualis-
ing clients in this way is that it gives the therapist some guidance as to how to work with a 
particular client or client problem. A Type 1 client who does not recognise that he has a prob-
lem is unlikely to work at changing their behaviour until they decide that there is something 
which they want to change. Motivational interviewing (MI) is an active directive approach to 
counselling which was developed initially as a means of developing substance abusing cli-
ents’ motivation for change and has considerable evidence for its effectiveness (Miller & Roll-
nick 2002). MI theory suggested that one of the frequent mistakes made by therapists work-
ing with clients with substance abuse problems is focusing prematurely on a problem before 
the client accepts there is a problem. As a result the clients becomes resistant and therapy 
more difficult as a result. A traditional REBT problem solving approach may result in a Type 
1 client concluding that the therapist is not listening to him (he does not believe he has a 
problem) and is therefore more likely to drop out of therapy. Conversely, a Type 3 client who 
is highly motivated to work on a problem is likely to respond well to a traditional REBT 
problem solving approach and become frustrated with a slower paced MI approach. There-
fore the style and pace of therapy needs to take the client’s view of their problem into ac-
count and spending a number of sessions exploring the client’s view of their problem may 
speed up therapy in the long run by engaging the client. MI aims to resolve a clients ambiva-
lence to change by eliciting statements from clients which endorse change as research has 
shown that such statements (termed “change talk” in MI) are positively correlated with ac-
tual behaviour change. 
The second idea I would like to suggest is the teaching of other practical skills and ideas out-
side of the traditional REBT model. As mentioned earlier research has shown that although 
REBT is effective at cognitive changes in clients with substance abuse this does not always 
translate to actual behaviour change. When reading the literature on CBT which has been 
proved effective with substance abuse it is apparent that a very wide variety of skills and 
techniques are taught. Substance abuse can have serious negative impact on many aspects of 
an individual’s life such as relationships, occupational and educational functioning. Much of 
the individual’s time is spent engaged in activities related to substance misuse and particu-
larly with teenagers, much of their identity is also related to substance abuse. For example, 
among teenagers who smoke cannabis they can frequently use the drug every day and often 
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when with their peers. In addition they may listen to music or relate to a famous star who 
endorses cannabis use, wear t-shirts which promote cannabis and even attend rallies seeking 
its legalisation. Even if such a teen decides that they wish to stop cannabis use most of their 
life revolves around its use, providing constant reminders and therefore increasing risk of 
relapse. Most of the REBT books on substance abuse focus on the irrational beliefs and un-
healthy emotions related to substance abuse with little attention paid to the other aspects 
which may influence substance misuse. No matter how rational a client becomes they will 
always be human and so not perfectly rational – therefore relapses are always possible. The 
more potential stressors and triggers which are dealt with will reduce the risk further. With 
this in mind the Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA) suggests a number of extra in-
terventions that may be provided to a client in addition to cognitive-behavioural techniques 
to reduce the likelihood of relapse (Meyers & Miller 2006). These include relationship coun-
selling, communication, problem solving, drink refusal and job seeking skills training. Simi-
larly, certain medications may also be useful in helping the client avoid relapses and access 
to them may be useful to a client and again emphasises the importance of access to a multi-
disciplinary team. For example, disulfiram (Antabuse) helps a client avoid drinking as the 
ingestion of alcohol will result in aversive reactions such as vomiting and sickness. 
 
Summary 
This article has described the current state of REBT research and theory with substance 
abusing adolescents. While numerous articles and books have been published which outline 
the REBT theory of substance abuse little empirical research has been completed and what 
research has been done does not support the effectiveness of REBT. In particular, there is 
almost no published work on the use of REBT with substance abusing adolescents. A number 
of specific points for working with adolescents have been offered along with some ideas which 
might improve the effectiveness of REBT with substance abuse. If REBT is to maintain its 
position as a leading cognitive-behavioural therapy in an increasingly more evidenced-based 
society much work is needed to develop the research and theory behind it. 
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The Problem and its Significance 
Effectiveness reviews generally conclude that cognitive therapy is effective in the treatment 
for depression (Department of Health, 2001; Hollon, Stewart, & Strunk, 2006; Paykel et al., 
1995).  However, the problem of relapse is a significant one. Left untreated, up to 80% of peo-
ple experiencing one major episode will experience additional episodes (Kessler, 2002).  
Moore & Garland (2003) argue that approximately 30% of treated individuals experience re-
lapse within 1-2 years from recovery, although cognitive therapy has been found to decrease 
relapse risk,  e.g. from 47% when drug treatment is used alone, to 29% when combined with 
extended cognitive therapy that includes a relapse prevention component (Paykel, Scott, 
Teasdale, & et al, 1999).    
Relapse increases the risk of depressive chronicity (Moore & Garland, 2003; Paykel et al., 
1995), and chronically depressed individuals are at greater risk for relapse and treatment-
resistance (Hamilton & Dobson, 2002; Scott, 1988), so much so that Post (1992) terms this 
effect the ‘kindling hypothesis’ (see also Monroe & Harkness, 2005).  Given the evidence, it 
seems timely now to reconsider our current understandings of the cognitive pathways to de-
pression, paying particular attention to components that may contribute to relapse. 
 
Negative Life-Events & Negative Affect 
Depression often follows negative/stressful life-events (Monroe & Hadjiyannakis, 2002), yet 
depression does not inevitably follow for all who experience such events.  Beck’s (1967) and 
Abramson et al’s (1978) models assume that affect, associated with a life-event, is based on 
how an individual interprets and deliberates about that situation (A. T. Beck, 1964; Ellis, 
Depression & Cognitive-Vulnerability: The 
Role of Dysfunctional Attitudes & Negative 
Attributional Styles 
Despina M Rothì  
This paper presents an evidence-based discussion of two cognitive approaches to understanding the 
onset, maintenance and treatment of depression: Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale’s (1978) hopeless-
ness, attribution-based theory, and Beck’s (1967) schema-based theory1.  More specifically, it com-
pares and contrasts the pathways to depression proposed by the two models.  The discussion focuses 
mainly on one particular aspect: ‘cognitive-vulnerability’.  This concept can be found in most cognitive 
theories of depression, although the manner with which it is conceptualised may differ. The discus-
sion commences by considering the effectiveness of cognitive therapy for depression, both in terms of 
facilitating remission and preventing relapse. The discussion then explores how the two models differ 
in their proposed pathways.  This includes an examination of the hypothesised developmental origins 
of cognitive-vulnerability, and the evidence for the correlational and causal status of cognitive-
vulnerability mechanisms proposed by the two theories.  The paper concludes with an evaluation of 
the potential utility of greater information in this area to cognitive-therapeutic practice and preven-
tative psychological well-being strategies.  
Key words: Depression, cognitive-vulnerability, attributional styles, cognitive therapy. 
1. Although there are a variety of models that may be called ‘attribution-based’ or ‘schema-based’, for the purposes of exposition 
these terms will be used in this paper to refer to Abramson et al’s (1978) and Beck’s (1967) models respectively. 
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1962).  For example, when negative events occur, people vary in terms of the intensity of 
their negative affective responses, for some these are severe enough to warrant classification 
of clinical depression (Ingram & Luxton, 2005).   
Major depressive episodes are characterised by intense low mood that is consistently present 
for two or more weeks, and occurs together with an assortment of associated disruptions that 
can be motivational, cognitive, physiological, social or behavioural in nature (see APA, 2000, 
p.320-327).   
Beck’s and Abramson et al’s models contain the thesis that depression susceptibility is influ-
enced by proximal and distal negatively biased cognitive mechanisms, i.e. those temporally 
close to or distant from depression onset respectively.  As such these models conceptualise 
depression as a cognitively mediated emotional disorder (Abramson & Alloy, 1990). Both 
models propose the following: 
a) Depressed mood and symptoms are a function of negatively biased distal cognitive mecha-
nisms (the cognitive-diatheses), and the occurrence of negative life-events (stress).  
b) That there are two main intervening proximal cognitive mechanisms that may mediate 
between the onset of depression, and cognitive-diatheses and stress. 
However, the models differ in two main ways: firstly, how the core distal cognitive mecha-
nism is conceptualised; and secondly, in the nature of the intervening proximal cognitive 
mechanisms2.   
 
The Development of Cognitive-Vulnerability Mechanisms 
Cognitive-vulnerability is thought to be a ‘trait-like’ quality, a relatively stable characteristic 
which may be change-resistant but is however mutable (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 2006).  
Beck’s (1967) conceptualisation revolves around the concept of schemas, which can be 
thought of as a set of ‘cognitive templates’, that contain dysfunctional attitudes acquired 
mainly in childhood (A. T. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979, p.12-13).  These lead to the for-
mation of cognitive distortions which are then accessed to aid cognitive information-
processing, resulting in a generalised tendency to negatively distort available information 
when similar situations arise.   
Alternatively, Abramson and colleagues argue that childhood experiences lead to the devel-
opment of generalised tendencies in attributional styles (Alloy et al., 1999).  As the child at-
tempts to find meaning for his/her experiences, he/she attempts to identify causes for nega-
tive life-events (Mezulis, Hyde, & Abramson, 2006; Rose & Abramson, 1992).  These cogni-
tive ‘tendencies’ then serve as interpretive aids.  “These [negative] events undermine the 
child’s positive self-image as well as his/her optimism about future positive events” (Ingram, 
2003, p.78).  Thus, development of these negative cognitive styles undermine the developing 
child’s conception of their own self-efficacy in influencing the outcome of future life-events, as 
well as their capacity to think positively about him/herself, thereby accentuating the likeli-
hood that they will become hopeless3.   
In summary, while Beck’s schema-based approach focuses on attitude acquisition and the 
information-processing aspects of development, Abramson’s attribution-based approach puts 
2. Both models include other variables in their conceptualisations that may interact with vulnerability variables to make an indi-
vidual more resilient to depression onset, e.g. social support, social skills, adaptive coping strategies (Ingram & Luxton, 2005; 
Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998; Ivanova & Israel, 2005; e.g. see: Kwon, Lee, Lee, & Bifulco, 2006). 
3. The strength of this motivational drive for a positive self-image has very strong and reliable empirical support in the social psy-
chological literature (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Greenberg et al., 1992; Higgins, 1987; e.g. see: Sedikides, 1993; Tajfel, 1981; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). 
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the search for meaning/explanation, and the motivation for positive self-image at the centre 
of the child’s strivings.  
 
Proximal Mechanisms: Cognitive Distortions & Negative Inferences 
Cognitive models propose that different forms of negative cognitive mechanisms observed in 
depressed individuals may not simply be depressive symptoms/concomitants, but rather 
causal antecedents (Ingram et al., 1998).   They propose intervening cognitive concepts 
(proximal mechanisms) mediate the relationship between negative life-events and the onset 
of depression.   
In Beck et al’s (1979) formulation, emotional distress is preceded by dysfunctional cognitions 
(see figure on p.5), automatic negative thinking that has been ‘filtered’ through an informa-
tion processing system that contains cognitive distortions (J. S. Beck, 1995).  Beck (1987) 
however, does not claim automatic negative thoughts involving the ‘cognitive triad’ cause de-
pression (see also Spangler, Simons, Monroe, & Thase, 1997).   
For Abramson et al (1989) negative inferences about the causes, consequences and self-
implications of negative life-events make individuals more likely to become hopeless (see fig-
ure).  However, there are conflicting opinions on the causal status of these proximal mecha-
nisms.  Some maintain they are causal (e.g. Ingram et al., 1998, p.113), while others claim 
such negative thinking does not cause depression but is part of it (e.g. Fennell, 1989).  Fur-
ther clarification is required to distinguish between the relatively ‘automatic’ process of cog-
nitively distorting information about the self, world and future, or negatively inferring 
causes, consequences and self-implications, from the resulting content, such as ‘I am worth-
less’, ‘things will never change’ or ‘this happens because I’m stupid’ (see also Fennell, Ben-
nett Levy, & Westbrook, 2004).  Furthermore, there is no reason why process and content 
cannot be both cause and effect, thereby contributing to the negative feedback loop that is so 
often seen in depression. 
 
Distal Mechanisms: Conceptualising Cognitive-Vulnerability 
In the schema-based approach the core distal cognitive-vulnerability component implied re-
fers to dysfunctional attitudes contained within schemas (e.g. “I am worthless if I do not pass 
all my exams”), while in the attribution-based approach the focus is on negative attributions 
contained within negative cognitive styles (e.g. “I perform badly in exams because I’m stu-
pid”).  The first is a conditional, attitude-based bias, the second a global, stable, inference-
based bias.   
Factor analytic research examining both dysfunctional attitudes and negative attributional 
styles has shown that these form discrete though correlated entities (Gotlib, Lewinsohn, 
Seeley, Rohde, & et al., 1993; Joiner & Rudd, 1996; Spangler et al., 1997).  Furthermore, 
these are not merely depression symptoms, rather symptoms form an additional though cor-
related factor (Spangler et al., 1997). 
These models overlap somewhat; both acknowledge that negatively biased self-efficacy 
(helplessness) can contribute to cognitive-vulnerability (Abramson et al., 1989; A. T. Beck, 
1999; J. S. Beck, 1995), and both include dysfunctional attitudes and negative attributions 
as potential depression concomitants.  The difference is in: a) the causal emphasis given to 
each of these components, and b) the nature of the effects from both negative life-events and 
each model’s version of the distal cognitive-vulnerability mechanism. 
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Diathesis & Stress or Diathesis-Stress? 
The distal, cognitive-vulnerability mechanism (the cognitive ‘diathesis’) and negative life-
events, (the associated ‘stress’ reaction), are considered to be the main ‘causal’ components 
that lead to either cognitive distortions (A. T. Beck et al., 1979) or negative inferences 
(Abramson et al., 1989). 
In the schema-based approach, stress is treated as a mediator between cognitive-diathesis 
(dysfunctional attitudes) and cognitive distortions; it is an intervening variable that 
‘transmits’ the effects from the first cognitive mechanism to the next.  Its presence is re-
quired in order for cognitive distortions to commence, as such the stress is considered to be 
the ‘critical incident’ (Fennell, 1989; also see figure).   
In the attribution-based approach, diathesis-stress (Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Sem-
mel, & Peterson, 1982) is conceptualised as an interaction between cognitive-diathesis 
(negative attributional style) and stress (again see figure).  Each of these variables is 
thought to have, not only independent effects, but also a combined effect, where each vari-
able can moderate the effect of the other.  In this way an extremely negative event (e.g. los-
ing all one’s family in the Holocaust) can result in depression even in the absence of negative 
attributional style, as can highly negative attributional styles even in the absence of nega-
tive events (Abramson et al., 1989).  However, reliable data to support/refute these hypothe-
ses is currently lacking (see also Alloy, Abramson, Safford, & Gibb, 2006).  An additional con-
found relates to the possibility that these variables may be intertwined in numerous ways, 
such as the influence of childhood stresses on the development of cognitive-diatheses in the 
first place (Traill & Gotlib, 2006). 
 
Dysfunctional Attitudes, Negative Attributional Styles & Depression  
Reviewing the extant literature reveals much evidence for the co-occurrence of depression 
and both dysfunctional attitudes and negative attributional styles (Dohr, Rush, & Bernstein, 
1989; Persons & Miranda, 1992; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).  Some studies reveal the 
intensification of both of these in remitted depressives under conditions of naturally occur-
ring/induced low mood (Abela, Brozina, & Seligman, 2004; Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005), or 
cognitive load (Wenzlaff, Meier, & Salas, 2002).  Alternatively, Rude, Covich, Jarrold, et al. 
(2001) report neither of these conditions are required if implicit measures are used (for a dis-
cussion on methodological issues see Riskind & Alloy, 2006).  However, much research con-
ducted in this area is retrospective, occurring either during or following a depressive episode.  
Evidence during an episode may simply indicate concomitant status, and evidence for persis-
tence following an episode may simply reflect “inert ‘scars’ of the disorder, persisting effects 
that have no functional role in vulnerability” (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 
2002, p.425).  
It has been surprisingly difficult to find reliable evidence for latent cognitive-vulnerability 
components (i.e. pre-depressive-episode occurrence) that may predispose one to depression 
(Ingram et al., 1998).  Evidence for the casual nature of these constructs is very limited.  
Given that cognitive models give these constructs causal status, these findings are problem-
atic for such conceptualisations.  
More recently, researchers have used prospective data, some derived from the longitudinal 
‘Temple-Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression’ (CVD) Project, to examine causal-
ity.  This well designed project provides some interesting findings, which, considered in con-
junction with other research, provide more convincing evidence. 
 
 16 
The Rat ional  Emotive Behaviour Therapist  Vo l  13,  Number 1 (2010)  
 17 
The Rat ional  Emotive Behaviour Therapist  Vo l  13,  Number 1 (2010)  
Issues & Controversies in Cognitive-Vulnerability: Research Evidence 
Attempts to investigate the role of cognitive-vulnerability provide interesting results.  
Spangler et al. (1997) for example, report depressed participants exhibited either dysfunc-
tional attitudes or negative attributional styles but not both, potentially indicating distinct 
pathways to depression and depression subtypes.  Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky (1988) have 
argued for such subtypes: ‘negative-cognitive-triad’ and ‘hopelessness’ depressions (for the 
criteria of hopelessness depression see Alloy, Abramson, Safford et al., 2006). Indeed, studies 
examining residual symptoms following cognitive therapy report that, although reduced, 
worthlessness and hopelessness symptoms are still present (Scott, Teasdale, Paykel, & et al, 
2000) potentially contributing to future susceptibility, possibly negative-cognitive-triad and 
hopelessness depression respectively. 
In the CVD project researchers classified participants using their scores on both dysfunc-
tional attitudes and negative attributional styles measures; those scoring in the top quartile 
on both measures (high-risk) were compared to those in the bottom quartile (low-risk).  Ret-
rospective data indicated high-risk participants were significantly more likely to have a his-
tory of both major (using DSM criteria) and hopelessness depression (Alloy et al., 2000).  Pro-
spective data (2½ year follow-up) indicated participants’ high-risk status predicted first on-
set and recurrence of major and hopelessness depression as well as minor episodes (see also 
prospective data from studies of depression in children and adolescents, e.g.: Abela & 
Hankin, 2008).  Moreover, risk-status also predicted depression comorbid with anxiety but 
not anxiety alone, suggesting cognitive-vulnerability, as defined by these two models, is de-
pression-specific (Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, & Neeren, 2006; Alloy & Riskind, 2006).  Re-
latedly, high-risk participants had higher historical and future suicidality (Alloy & Riskind, 
2006).  
Given the manner with which participants were classified, the CVD findings do not clarify 
which, if any, form of cognitive-vulnerability dominates.  In a separate study however, Haef-
fel, Abramson, Voelz et al. (2003) report that although both forms were associated with de-
pression, negative attributional styles showed consistently stronger associations with both 
major and hopelessness depression than did dysfunctional attitudes.  Additionally, compari-
sons between remitted and never depressed individuals indicated remitted individuals had 
significantly higher negative attributional styles; no significant differences were observed in 
levels of dysfunctional attitudes.   
An additional important point that may help explain these findings is highlighted by Gibb, 
Alloy, Abramson, Beevers & Miller (2004).  These authors suggest caution when interpreting 
findings from continuous data that has been dichotomised to form subgroups for comparison 
(as in the CVD project).  They argue quantitative dichotomisation does not necessarily indi-
cate qualitative differences in negative cognitive styles and that it may also obscure the pres-
ence of non-linear relationships.  Their research indicates cognitive vulnerability is present 
in all individuals to lesser or greater degree and that the important factor may not be a mat-
ter of type of negative cognitive style but rather the strength of its influence when in interac-
tion with other factors (such as negative life events). 
 
Conclusions & Practice Implications  
This paper has reviewed evidence and current understandings of cognitive-vulnerability to 
depression.  It has highlighted differences apparent in the extant literature that seeks to elu-
cidate the influence of various cognitive mechanisms considered relevant to depression onset, 
maintenance and relapse.  The mixed evidence indicates negative attributional styles and 
dysfunctional attitudes are correlated with cognitive-vulnerability; it also suggests causal re-
lationships, however the strength of the causal arguments requires further investigation and 
evidence.  As such whether the different forms of cognitive vulnerability lead to different de-
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pression subtypes is also currently unclear.  Although some commentators suggest instead 
that both forms may “co-occur [to] make depression more likely still” (Joiner & Rudd, 1996, 
p.65). 
A clarification of the casual components of cognitive-vulnerability may provide a means for 
determining where the focus of cognitive therapy should be both for preventing relapse and 
for early intervention in those presenting with depression, thereby potentially reducing the 
incidence of relapse.  For example, therapy could focus on attenuating clients’ dysfunctional 
attitudes, negative attributional styles or both, depending on the clients’ particular presenta-
tion. Many strategies already exist to tackle both these cognitive-vulnerabilities, such as: ac-
tivity monitoring and scheduling, Socratic questioning, behavioural experiments, rational-
emotional role-play, decentering, attentional control training and attributional retraining, to 
name a few (Abramson et al., 1978; J. S. Beck, 1995; Bennett Levy et al., 2004; Forsterling, 
1985, 2001; Hilt, 2004; Segal et al., 2002).  The more precise application of these can only 
serve to augment the effectiveness of cognitive therapy.  
Further clarifying the role of different cognitive-vulnerabilities can better inform pro-active 
psychological well-being strategies, potentially preventing initial depression-onset, e.g. in 
schools as part of the government’s ‘Healthy Schools’ emotional well-being initiative 
(Department of Education and Skills, 2003; Department of Health, 2005).  Evidence exists 
that teaching children to make more positive attributions for negative life-events provides 
some protection against future depression (Gillham, Reivich, Jaycox, & Seligman, 1995; Jay-
cox, Reivich, Gillham, & Seligman, 1994).  Additionally, informed pro-active strategies can 
also be included in national parenting schemes (Home Office, 2006) that aim to teach par-
ents about harmful/protective parenting styles. 
In conclusion, the schema-based approach that informs much of our cognitive therapeutic 
practice has served us well, both as practitioners and clients.  However, the incidence of de-
pression-relapse, as argued at the beginning of this paper, continues to be a problem.  It now 
seems timely both to reconsider our approach and energise our endeavours to better under-
stand the differences between those individuals who show life-time and short-term remis-
sion.  This is particularly important in the current NHS climate, which is veering more to-
wards short/time-limited, solution-focused therapy.  Finally, in the opinion of this author, 
given what we now know about the course and recurrence of depression, cognitive therapy, 
without due consideration to client’s particular cognitive-vulnerabilities, and without a re-
lapse prevention component after remission, represents a false economy.  The cost of our cur-
rent approach is indeed high and multifarious: it impacts our depressed clients’ lives and 
those of their families; it allows the perpetuation, from one generation to the next, of a treat-
able difficulty; it damages the economy through lost workdays; and, because relapsed clients 
require multiple treatment cycles, it increases national economic health costs. 
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Introduction 
There have been many approaches to outline the defining features of Rational Emotive Be-
haviour Therapy (e.g. Dryden, 2009, Ellis, 1994) but none have done so just by detailing the 
four elements that comprise the name of the therapy: i) rational; ii) emotive iii) behaviour 
and iv) therapy. In this article I will show how you can teach trainees about REBT by using 
this four element approach. As you read the article, please note that I am addressing train-
ees and students who do not know about the approach or are relatively new to it.  
 
Rational 
When Albert Ellis established the therapy in the 1950s, he called it “Rational Ther-
apy” (Ellis, 1958). He did so because he wanted to stress that emotional problems are based 
on irrational thinking and that if we are to address these problems effectively, we need to 
change such thinking to its rational equivalent. It is interesting to note that while REBT has 
had two previous names, the term “rational” is common to all three names. It is the constant 
feature that spans REBT’s 50+ year old history. So what do REBT therapists currently mean 
by the term “rational”? I can best answer this question if I contrast it with the term 
“irrational”. 
The terms “rational” and “irrational” in current REBT theory are most commonly used as ad-
jectives in front of the noun “beliefs”. Such beliefs can also be thought of as attitudes in that 
they describe a person’s stance or position towards something. 
Let me consider the major characteristics of rational beliefs and contrast these with the ma-
jor characteristics of irrational beliefs. In what follows, I will consider the rational belief in 
the left hand column and the irrational belief in the right hand column to facilitate the com-
parison. 
Training & Education Section: 
 
What is Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT)?: 
Outlining the Approach by Considering the Four Ele-
ments of its Name 
Windy Dryden 
Goldsmiths University of London 
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A Rational Belief is Flexible or Non-
extreme 
1. A rational belief is flexible 
Here is an example of a rational belief that 
is flexible. 
   
“I want my colleague to like me, but she does 
not have to do so” 
  
 Imagine that you hold such a belief. As you 
do so you will see that this belief is flexible 
because while you assert what you want (i.e. 
“I want my colleague to like me…”), you also 
acknowledge that you do not have to get 
what you want (i.e. “…but she does not have 
to do so”). 
  
  
 
 
 
 
2. A rational belief is non-extreme 
Here is an example of a rational belief that 
is non-extreme. 
  
“It is bad if my colleague does not like me, 
but not the end of the world” 
  
  
Again imagine that you hold this belief. As 
you do so you will see that this belief is non-
extreme because while you assert that you 
find the event negative (i.e. “It is bad if my 
colleague does not like me…”), you also ac-
knowledge that such an evaluation is not ex-
treme because it could always be worse (i.e. 
“…but not the end of the world”). 
  
  
  
An Irrational Belief is Rigid or Extreme 
1. An irrational belief is rigid 
Here is an example of an irrational belief 
that is rigid. 
  
 
“My colleague has to like me” 
  
To compare this belief with the flexible ver-
sion in the left-hand column, we need to 
state it in its full form 
“I want my colleague to like me, therefore she 
has to do so” 
  
Again imagine that you hold this belief. As 
you do so you will see that this belief is rigid 
because while you not only assert what you 
want (i.e. “I want my colleague to like 
me…”), you also demand that you have to 
get it (i.e. “…therefore she has to do so”) 
  
  
2. An irrational belief is extreme 
Here is an example of an irrational belief 
that is extreme. 
  
“It is the end of the world if my colleague 
does not like me” 
  
To compare it to the non-extreme version in 
the left-hand column we need to state it in 
its full form 
  
“It is bad if my colleague does not like me, 
and therefore it is the end of the world” 
  
Again imagine that you hold this belief. As 
you do so you will see that this belief is ex-
treme because you not only assert that you 
find the event negative (i.e. “It is bad if my 
colleague does not like me…”), you also claim 
that it could not be worse (i.e. “…and there-
fore it is the end of the world”). 
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A Rational Belief is True 
Imagine that you hold the following rational 
belief that I introduced above: “I want my 
colleague to like me, but she does not have to 
do so”. You will note that this belief is made 
up of two parts: 
“I want my colleague to like me....” 
“.... but she does not have to do so” 
  
Let’s take one part at a time. First, you can 
prove that you would like your colleague to 
like you; after you this is your desire. Also, 
you can probably cite reasons why you want 
your colleague to like you (e.g. it makes for a 
good working relationship where you can 
help each other). So, the first part of your 
belief is true. 
  
Now let’s look at the second part of the ra-
tional belief. You can also prove that the 
other person does not have to like you. To 
state otherwise would be to deny that person 
free choice. 
So if both parts of this rational belief then 
we can say that the belief taken as a whole 
is true. 
  
An Irrational Belief is False 
Now imagine that you hold the following ir-
rational belief that I introduced above: “My 
colleague has to like me” . Again this belief is 
made up of two parts: 
“I want my colleague to like me....” 
“.... and therefore she has to do so” 
  
  
Let’s take one part at a time. First, you can 
again prove that you would like the other 
person to like you for reasons discussed op-
posite. So, the first part of your belief is 
true. 
  
  
Now let’s look at the second part of the irra-
tional belief. You cannot prove that your col-
league has to like you. If that were true, she 
would have no choice but to like you. This 
demanding component of your irrational be-
lief in effects robs your colleague of free 
choice, which she retains in the face of your 
demand. Thus, this second part is false. 
As both parts of a belief have to be true for 
the belief to be true the we can say that the 
irrational belief is false. 
Also, when we consider this irrational belief 
in its short form (i.e. “My colleague has to 
like me”) then it is clear that it is false since 
it again attempts to rob your colleague of the 
freedom not to like you which she does in 
reality have. 
  
A Rational Belief is Sensible 
Taking the rational belief: “I want my col-
league to like me, but she does not have to do 
so” we can ask the question: does this belief 
make sense? We can answer that it does 
since you are explicitly acknowledging that 
there is no connection between what you 
want and what you have to get. 
  
An Irrational Belief is Not Sensible 
Taking the full form of your irrational  be-
lief: “I want my colleague to like me, and 
therefore she has to do so” we can again ask 
the question: does this belief makes sense? 
Here our answer is that it does not because 
it asserts that there is a connection between 
what you want and what you have to get. 
The idea that because you want something 
you have to get it is, in fact, childish non-
sense when coming from an adult. 
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A Rational Belief is Largely Construc-
tive 
  
When you hold a rational belief the conse-
quences of doing so will be largely construc-
tive. For example let’s suppose that you hold 
the following rational belief: “I want my col-
league to like me, but she does not have to do 
so”  and you bring this belief to a situation 
where your colleague snaps at you for no 
good reason. In this situation you will ex-
perience three different, but related conse-
quences which I will now illustrate: 
  
  
 
Emotional consequence 
Here you will tend to concerned about your 
colleague’s response, but not anxious about 
it 
  
Behavioural consequence 
Here you will be likely to enquire of your col-
league in an open way if there is anything 
wrong 
  
Thinking consequence 
Here you will tend to think that your col-
league is upset with someone or something 
which could be to do with you, but may well 
be nothing to do with you 
  
 
An Irrational Belief is Largely Uncon-
structive 
  
When you hold an irrational belief the con-
sequences of doing so will be largely uncon-
structive. For example let’s suppose that you 
hold the following irrational belief: “My col-
league must like me”  and you bring this be-
lief to the situation where your colleague 
snaps at you for no good reason. In this 
situation you will experience three different, 
but related consequences which I will now 
illustrate. As I do so, compare these conse-
quences to those that stem from your belief 
if it were rational (see opposite) 
  
Emotional consequence 
Here you will tend to anxious, rather than  
concerned about your colleague’s response 
  
Behavioural consequence 
Here you will tend not to avoid your col-
league or try desperately to get her to like 
you 
  
  
Thinking consequence 
Here you will tend to think that your col-
league is upset with you rather with some-
one or something that had nothing to do 
with you 
  
  
Emotive 
The term “emotive” in REBT means that which is relevant to your emotions. Like every 
other approach to therapy REBT is based on a model of emotions. Since REBT is a therapeu-
tic approach it is primarily concerned with relieving people’s emotional disturbance. How-
ever, it also acknowledges that people are bound to have negative emotions when faced with 
negative life events (henceforth called adversities in this book). To accommodate these two 
positions REBT distinguishes between emotions that are negative in tone and have largely 
unconstructive consequences and emotions that are negative in tone and have largely con-
structive consequences. The former are known as unhealthy negative emotions (UNEs) and 
the latter healthy negative emotions (UNEs). 
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The REBT Model of Emotions 
The REBT model of emotion states that the emotions that we experience are based largely on 
the beliefs that we hold about ourselves, others and the world. More specifically it states that 
our unhealthy negative emotions about life’s adversities are based largely on the irrational 
beliefs that we hold about these adversities and that if we want to experience healthy nega-
tive emotions about the adversities in question we need to change our irrational beliefs to ra-
tional beliefs. 
This is shown in the following figure in which “A” stands for adversity, “B” for beliefs and “C” 
for the consequences of these beliefs (in this case the emotional consequences). This is 
REBT’s famous ABC model which you can find outlined in any REBT textbook (e.g. Dryden 
& Branch, 2008).  
                  A                                     B                                       C  
 
 
Let me illustrate this model by referring to the example that I introduced earlier in this 
chapter. 
              A                            B                                  C   
 
 
Because life’s adversities are negative, it is not appropriate for you to feel good about them or 
even neutral about them. It is healthy to experience negative emotions, but not problematic 
ones about such life events. These problematic emotions in REBT are known as unhealthy 
negative emotions (UNEs) and these are listed in the following table and contrasted with 
their healthy negative equivalents. 
 
     Unhealthy Negative Emotions             Healthy Negative Emotions
 
Adversity Irrational Beliefs Unhealthy Negative 
Emotions 
Adversity Rational Beliefs Healthy Negative Emo-
tions 
Adversity 
My colleague may not 
like me 
Irrational Belief 
My colleague must like 
me 
Unhealthy Negative 
Emotion 
Anxiety 
Adversity 
My colleague may not 
like me 
Rational Belief 
I want my colleague to 
like me, but she does not 
have to do so 
Healthy Negative Emo-
tion 
Concern 
Anxiety Concern 
Depression Sadness 
Guilt Remorse 
Shame Disappointment 
Unhealthy Anger Healthy Anger 
Hurt Sorrow 
Unhealthy Jealousy Healthy Jealousy 
Unhealthy Envy Healthy Envy 
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I want to make two points here; 
As detailed above, unhealthy negative emotions (UNEs) largely stem from irrational be-
liefs about life’s adversities while healthy negative emotions stem largely from ra-
tional beliefs about these same adversities. 
We do not have commonly agreed words in the English language to describe healthy 
negative emotions. The terms that I have used in the right hand column of the above 
table are my own. Feel free to use alternative terns that are more meaningful to you. 
 
 
Intellectual vs. Emotive Understanding 
 
The other major area where the term “emotive” comes up in REBT is in distinguishing be-
tween two different types of understanding: intellectual understanding and emotive under-
standing (Ellis, 1963). These are particularly important when a person is trying to change an 
irrational belief to its rational belief alternative. 
 
Let me illustrate this distinction by using the above example where you currently hold the 
irrational belief (i.e. “My colleague must like me”) and your colleague has snapped at you. 
Let’s suppose that you acknowledge that your irrational belief is irrational (meaning that it 
is rigid, false, not sensible and largely unconstructive – see above). And let’s assume, further-
more, that you acknowledge that your rational alternative belief (i.e. I want my colleague to 
like me, but she does not have to do so”) is rational (meaning that it is flexible, true, sensible 
and largely constructive. When your understanding of these two points is intellectual in na-
ture, you say things like “Well, I can understand this in my head, but not in my heart” and “I 
understand it, but I don’t feel it”. Here, you will still feel anxious about the prospect of your 
colleague not liking you, you will act in ways that are consistent with your irrational belief 
(i.e. you will either avoid your colleague or desperately try to get her to like you) and you will 
tend to think in highly distorted ways about your colleague (e.g. “She is definitely upset with 
me” and “If I don’t win her over immediately, she will never like me again”). In other words, 
while you understand intellectually the reason why your irrational belief is irrational belief 
and why your rational belief is rational, this understand has little or no impact on your emo-
tions, behaviour and subsequent thinking. You still think, act and feel in ways consistent 
with your irrational belief even though you know it is irrational.   
  
However, when your understanding of these points is emotive in nature, you not only grasp 
the points intellectually, but you also feel, think and act in ways that are consistent with the 
rational belief and that are inconsistent with the irrational belief. Thus, you will feel con-
cerned, but not anxious about the prospect of your colleague not liking you, you will act in 
ways that are consistent with your rational belief (i.e. you will check out with her why she 
snapped at you) and you will tend to think in realistic ways about your colleague (e.g. “She 
may or may not be upset with me” and “If she is upset with me, we can talk it though and 
resolve the issue”). In other words, you understand the reason why your irrational belief is 
irrational belief and why your rational belief is rational and this understanding has a de-
cided constructive impact on your emotions, behaviour and subsequent thinking. You think, 
act and feel in ways consistent with your rational belief.    
In REBT, we argue that intellectual understanding is a necessary, but insufficient ingredi-
ent for constructive psychological change and many of the chapters in this book are devoted 
to helping you to move from such intellectual understanding to the emotive understanding 
necessary for such change to occur.  
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Behaviour 
The term “behaviour” in REBT refers to both overt behaviour and to an urge to act that is 
not translated into overt behaviour. The latter is known as an action tendency. REBT’s 
model of behaviour parallels its model of emotions in arguing that irrational beliefs tend to 
lead to behaviour that is largely unconstructive in effect and that rational beliefs lead to be-
haviour that is largely constructive in effect. The former is associated with unhealthy nega-
tive emotions (UNEs) and the latter and the latter with healthy negative emotions (HNEs).  
     
This is shown in the following figure in which “A” stands for adversity, “B” for beliefs and “C” 
for the consequences of these beliefs (in this case the behavioural consequences).   
 
 
             A                                    B                                 C   
 
 
 
Let me illustrate this model by referring again to the example that I introduced earlier in 
this chapter. 
 
 
               A                             B                                   C   
 
In the table below, I outline the major behaviours associated with the eight unhealthy and 
healthy negative emotions listed above. 
 
      
Adversity Irrational Beliefs Unconstructive Behaviour 
Adversity Rational Beliefs Constructive Behaviour 
Adversity 
My colleague may not like 
me 
Irrational Belief 
My colleague must like me 
  
Unconstructive  Behaviour 
 
Avoidance of colleague 
 
Desperate attempts to get 
colleague to like me 
Adversity 
My colleague may not like 
me 
Rational Belief 
I want my colleague to like 
me, but she does not have to 
do so 
Constructive Behaviour 
Asking colleague directly if 
there is anything wrong 
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Unhealthy Negative Emotion with Asso-
ciated Unconstructive Behaviours and 
Action Tendencies 
Healthy Negative Emotion with Associ-
ated Constructive Behaviours and Ac-
tion Tendencies 
Anxiety 
Withdrawing from threat 
Avoiding threat 
Seeking reassurance even though not re-
assurable 
Seeking safety from threat 
Concern 
Confronting threat 
Seeking reassurance when reassurable 
  
Depression 
Prolonged withdrawal from enjoyable ac-
tivities 
  
Sadness 
Engaging with enjoyable activities after 
a period of mourning or adjustment to 
the loss 
  
Guilt 
Begging for forgiveness 
  
Remorse 
Asking, not begging, for forgiveness 
  
Shame 
Withdrawing from others 
Avoiding eye contact with others 
  
Disappointment 
Keeping in contact with others 
Maintaining eye contact with others 
Hurt 
Sulking 
Sorrow 
Assertion and communicating with     
others 
  
Unhealthy anger 
Aggression (direct and indirect) 
  
Healthy anger 
Assertion 
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Unhealthy jealousy 
Prolonged suspicious questioning of the 
other person 
Checking on the other 
 Restricting the other 
  
Healthy jealousy 
Brief, open-minded questioning of the 
other person 
Not checking on the other 
Not restricting the other 
Unhealthy envy 
Spoiling the other’s enjoyment of the de-
sired possession 
Healthy envy 
Striving to gain a similar possession  for 
oneself if it is truly what you want 
The behaviours listed are above are what a person does or tends to do when her irrational or 
rational belief about an adversity has been fully activated. However, the impact of belief on 
behaviour can be seen in other ways.  
Short-term Self-protective Behaviour 
In the ABC model that I have presented in this article, an adversity occurs or is deemed to 
occur at “A”, the person holds a belief about this adversity at “B” and experiences emotional, 
behavioural and thinking consequences of holding this belief at “C”. In this model the per-
son’s belief (e.g. “My colleague must like me”) is specific to the specific adversity that she en-
counters.  
However, beliefs can be held at a more general level (e.g. “People with whom I work must 
like me”) and when a belief is more general in nature, the person has a tendency to bring 
such a belief with them, as it were, to situations where a relevant adversity may occur. 
Thus, in our example, if a person holds a general irrational belief (e.g. “People with whom I 
work must like me”), then the person will be hypersensitive to the possibility of not being 
liked by a colleague and act to prevent this adversity actually occurring (e.g. by being extra 
nice to a person whom she thinks may, but has not yet shown her some disapproval). In this 
way the person is acting to protect herself in the short-term, but the longer-term effect of 
this behaviour is unconstructive in a number of ways: 
She does not get to test out her hunch that the person will disapprove of her 
She does not get to deal constructively with such disapproval should it occur and 
She tends to maintain her irrational belief since she is acting in a way that is consistent 
with it  
 
Over-compensatory Behaviour 
 
When a person holds an irrational belief and particularly one that is general in nature, then 
she may try to deal with actual or potential adversities by behaving in a manner that is over-
compensatory. By using over-compensatory behaviour the person is trying to prove to herself 
the opposite of what she actually thinks is the truth about her, the other person or the world. 
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A common example of this occurs when a person privately considers that he would be weak if 
he can’t deal with a challenge, but tries to prove to himself that he is strong by facing an 
even greater challenge.    
 
Therapy 
The word “therapy” comes from the Greek "therapeia" meaning "a service, an attendance" 
which, in turn, is related to the Greek verb "therapeuo" meaning "I wait upon." 
REBT therapists, therefore, can be seen to offer a “service” to people who have problems in a 
number of areas: i) emotional problems; ii) practical, dissatisfaction problems and iii) per-
sonal development problems (Bard, 1980, Grieger & Boyd, 1980 ; Wessler & Wessler, 1980). 
A distinctive feature of REBT is that it outlines a logical order for dealing with these prob-
lems.  
 
Disturbance before Dissatisfaction 
REBT argues that unless there are good reasons to the contrary, it is best for us to address 
our emotional problems before our dissatisfaction problems (Dryden, 1985). The reasoning is 
as follows. If we try and deal with our dissatisfaction before we deal with our emotional dis-
turbance, then our disturbed feelings will get in the way of our efforts to change directly the 
adversities about which we are dissatisfied.  
For example, let’s take the example of Paul who is dissatisfied about his wife’s spending hab-
its. However, he is also unhealthily angry about her behaviour and every time he talks to her 
about it he makes himself angry about it, raises his voice to his wife and makes pejorative 
remarks about her and her spending behaviour. Now what is the likely impact of Paul’s ex-
pression of unhealthy anger on his wife? Does it encourage her to stand back and look objec-
tively at her own behaviour? Of course, it doesn’t. Paul’s angry behaviour is more likely to 
lead his wife to become unhealthily angry herself and/or to become defensive. In Paul’s case, 
his anger had, in fact, both effects on his wife. Now, let’s suppose that Paul first addressed 
his unhealthy anger and then discussed his dissatisfaction with his wife. His annoyance at 
her behaviour, but his acceptance of her as a person would help him to view her own behav-
iour perhaps as a sign of emotional disturbance and his compassion for her would have very 
different effects on her. She would probably be less defensive and because Paul would not be 
unhealthily angry, then his wife would also be less likely to be unhealthily angry. With an-
ger out of the picture, the stage would be set for Paul to address the reasons for his dissatis-
faction more effectively. 
 
Disturbance before Development 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, I used to go to a number of encounter groups. This was the 
era of personal growth or development. However, there were a number of casualties of these 
groups and when these occurred it was because attendees were preoccupied with issues of 
emotional disturbance and they were being pushed too very hard to go into areas of develop-
ment that warranted greater resilience.  
In general then, it is very difficult for us to develop ourselves when we are emotionally dis-
turbed. To focus on areas of development when someone is emotionally disturbed is akin to 
encourage that person to climb a very steep hill with very heavy weights attached to their 
ankles. First, help the person to remove their ankle weights (i.e. address their emotional dis-
turbance) before discussing the best way of climbing the hill! 
 
Dissatisfaction before Development 
Abraham Maslow (1968) is perhaps best known for his work on self-actualisation. The rele-
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vance of this concept for our present discussion is this. It is very difficult for humans to focus 
on higher order “needs” when we are preoccupied with issues with respect to lower-order 
needs. Thus, if a person is faced with a general dissatisfying life experience which cannot be 
compartmentalised and also wants to explore his writing ambitions, he should address the 
former first unless this life dissatisfaction will help him write a better book! 
While I have outlined REBT’s preferred order in dealing with problems, it also values flexi-
bility. Thus, if a person wants to deal with his problems in a different order, he should do so 
and observe the results. If it works, that is fine. If not then REBT’s preferred position may 
prove to yield better results. The proof of the pudding is in the eating!    
 
Conclusion   
While outlining REBT by considering the four elements that comprise its name is not com-
prehensive, it does introduce trainees and other students relatively unfamiliar with REBT 
with some of its key elements.  
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